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  <title>wo's weblog</title>
  <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/</link>
  <description>Musings in Analytic Philosophy</description>

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    <title>Comment by Alexander Pruss on 'Counterexamples to Good's Theorem'</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2021/740#c2467</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2021/740#c2467</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 15 Apr 2026 15:26:53 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Doesn&#039;t the move from (6&#039;) to (7&#039;) inherit all the issues that are facing (1&#039;)? Indeed, doesn&#039;t (1&#039;) follow by applying (6&#039;)=(7&#039;) to the special case where the partition (E_k) is trivial? Or am I missing something?]]></description>
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    <title>Comment by David Duffy on 'The tyranny of the objective'</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/828#c2464</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/828#c2464</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 23 Feb 2026 02:35:59 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[As to Isaacs et al, if one looks at this as a statistical problem, it is<br />
that of estimation of the binomial parameter n from a single observation (eg Jeffrey&#039;s tramcar). If p is known, then the generalized Bayes estimator of n with improper prior pi(n) ~ 1/n is 1/p. The likelihood ratio comparing two hypothetical n&#039;s should be (1-p)^(n1-n2) * n1/n2, so if p is small and n1=1, then it increases by 1 for each increment of n2.]]></description>
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    <title>Comment by David Duffy on 'The tyranny of the objective'</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/828#c2463</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/828#c2463</guid>
    <pubDate>Sat, 21 Feb 2026 06:31:41 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[&quot;...the hypothesis that there is exactly one inhabited universe&quot; is<br />
different from &quot;I inhabit a universe&quot;<br />
<br />
I&#039;m feeling a bit dull, but doesn&#039;t the former imply non-independence of p&#039;s ie existence of life in U1 extinguishes probability of occurrence in the other universes? ]]></description>
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    <title>Comment by Jonathan Mai on 'Teaching logic: Tarski vs Mates vs "logical constants"'</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2025/822#c2462</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2025/822#c2462</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 21:01:22 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Yes, you&#039;re right about the associated proof systems using free variables. I forgot about that since I approach logic from a model theoretic standpoint.<br />
<br />
As an aside, using complete expansions of models that is, structures containing a constant for every member of the expanded model, is a usual device in elementary model theory (Robinson diagrams etc.). So in this respect the expansion based semantics for the quantifiers matches model theoretic perspectives rather well.]]></description>
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    <item>
    <title>Comment by wo on 'Teaching logic: Tarski vs Mates vs "logical constants"'</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2025/822#c2461</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2025/822#c2461</guid>
    <pubDate>Mon, 16 Feb 2026 16:12:31 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Thanks Jonathan. Right, I&#039;ve seen versions of this as well. I guess it&#039;s usually combined with proof systems that use free variables, so it&#039;s not quite what I had in mind. I&#039;m also worried that it reinforces use/mention mistakes: especially in maths context, many students need to be constantly reminded of the distinction between objects in the domain and our names for these objects.<br />
<br />
On the flip side, in proof theory/tableau texts, one sometimes finds &quot;eigenvariables&quot; or &quot;parameters&quot; that are used specifically to instantiate universal quantifiers. But these usually don&#039;t figure in the semantics, as far as I can tell.]]></description>
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    <item>
    <title>Comment by Jonathan Mai on 'Teaching logic: Tarski vs Mates vs "logical constants"'</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2025/822#c2460</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2025/822#c2460</guid>
    <pubDate>Sat, 14 Feb 2026 22:47:34 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Your approach resembles the alternative to a satisfaction based semantics for quantification you find in several introductory texts on mathematical logic (van Dalen and Hedman, for instance): What we define is a truth relation between models and sentences. The truth definition for universally quantified sentences involves the truth of all of its instances in an expanded model which contains a fresh constant for every member of the model in question.<br />
<br />
]]></description>
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    <title>Comment by David Duffy on 'Are we living in a computer simulation?'</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/827#c2458</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/827#c2458</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2026 06:20:59 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[I see the simulation hypothesis as per Tipler 1994 (appealing to Dyson&#039;s &quot;Time without end: Physics and biology in an open universe&quot;):<br />
<br />
1) In the current cosmology &quot;observed&quot; within our simulation, a high computing future is quite possible.<br />
2) There will be an interest by such future entities in running simulations of universes<br />
3) The physics within simulations performed will be based the actual physics underlying those computers - Anthropic arguments might mean that these are the only ones that run nicely.<br />
<br />
3 is where the infinite skeptical possibilities are constrained.<br />
<br />
As to Boltzmann brains, you only need 1 good one.<br />
Iammarino, Darren. &quot;God is a Boltzmann Brane: Arriving at God via Physicalism.&quot; Theology and Science 23.1 (2025): 167-182<br />
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    <title>Comment by wo on 'Integrating centred information'</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/826#c2457</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/826#c2457</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 23 Jan 2026 12:20:49 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Thanks Stephan! I didn&#039;t know that paper. I still haven&#039;t read it, but from what you say, I probably don&#039;t fully agree with how Ismael &amp; Pollock describe the situation.<br />
<br />
With respect to my beliefs, I don&#039;t think I genuinely locate myself inside my head. I self-attribute properties like being 180 cm tall, and I don&#039;t think anything inside my head is 180 cm tall. So the &quot;I am here&quot; arrow in my belief worlds doesn&#039;t seem to be pointing at something inside my head. So I don&#039;t &quot;take myself to be located&quot; at the focal point of my visual field, as I&amp;P claim, although I admit that there is some temptation to do so, in certain contexts, because my visual input is centred on this location.<br />
<br />
You might respond that I don&#039;t self-attribute properties like being 180 cm tall; rather, I self-attribute being part of a human body that is 180 cm tall. More precisely: we could explain my thoughts and assertions about my height (etc) even if we assumed that the &quot;I am here&quot; arrow in my belief space points at my brain, or at my pineal gland. That seems right, and it&#039;s interesting how little hangs on the choice. I still prefer the view that the arrow points at my entire body, because it&#039;s more straightforward. But this might ultimately just be a modelling choice. Not sure!<br />
<br />
(I also don&#039;t fully agree that it even &quot;appears to me visually&quot; that I&#039;m located inside my brain. I don&#039;t think my visual input represents me at all.)<br />
<br />
The practical reasoning connection seems right, but I&#039;m not sure how much it helps to determine what the &quot;I am here&quot; arrow singles out. Somehow, I must realize that my choices affect the movement of this mouth and these arms etc., but this doesn&#039;t settle whether the arrow&#039;s destination is a body that includes the mouth and arms, or just the brain, or the pineal gland, or a point in space 1m to the left of the pineal gland.<br />
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