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  <title>wo's weblog</title>
  <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/</link>
  <description>Musings in Analytic Philosophy</description>

  <item>
    <title>Counterfactual definiteness</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/837</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/837</guid>
    <pubDate>Sat, 12 Sep 2026 15:46:44 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[A peculiar question that has divided philosophers since the Middle
Ages (and possibly earlier) concerns the status of Conditional
Excluded Middle. CEM says that for any propositions A and C, either
C would be the case if A were the case, or ¬C would be the case if A
were the case. Some accept CEM as valid, others reject it. In the last
few decades, the CEM supporters have been gaining ground, especially in
the field of semantics. See, for example, Williams 2010, Moss 2013,
Mandelkern
2018, S...]]></description>
  </item>
    <item>
    <title>Are credences beliefs about probability?</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/836</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/836</guid>
    <pubDate>Sat, 29 Aug 2026 09:46:41 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[There's a lively literature on how graded beliefs (credences) relate
to ungraded beliefs. Some hold that ungraded beliefs are reducible to
credences, others that credences are reducible to ungraded beliefs; yet
others hold that both are real and irreducible to one another. I find
this debate confusing. By which of course I mean: confused. I'll try to
explain why. I'll also comment on one particular proposal, that
credences are beliefs about probability; an interestingly new version of
this ha...]]></description>
  </item>
    <item>
    <title>Neg-raising through question-raising?</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/835</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/835</guid>
    <pubDate>Wed, 26 Aug 2026 11:33:40 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA["Neg-raising" occurs when a negation that appears to have wide scope
(over some operator) is interpreted as having narrow scope. For example,
(1) conveys not only the absence of a belief that pizza is available (as
one might expect), but also the presence of a belief that pizza is
unavailable.
(1)I don't think there's any pizza.
There is a large literature on this phenomenon, with many competing
explanations. Foolishly, I've tried to contribute to this literature
with a new proposal.
My propo...]]></description>
  </item>
    <item>
    <title>Moral fictionalism, cooperation, and motivation</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/834</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/834</guid>
    <pubDate>Tue, 18 Aug 2026 13:16:33 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Gerritsen
2023 raises a good worry about revolutionary moral fictionalism,
as advocated in Joyce
2001.
The (revolutionary moral) fictionalist says that our naive moral
practice rests on the mistaken assumption that there are
mind-independent moral facts. There are no such facts. But this doesn't
mean that we should stop caring about morality. It is in our personal
interest, according to the fictionalist, to adopt a fiction of morality
and continue talking and acting much like before.
Gerritse...]]></description>
  </item>
    <item>
    <title>Logical omniscience: beyond fragmentation and impossible worlds</title>
    <link>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/833</link>
    <guid>https://www.umsu.de/blog/2026/833</guid>
    <pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 13:38:25 +0000</pubDate>
    <description><![CDATA[Standard Bayesianism assumes that agents are "logically omniscient":
they assign credence 1 to all necessary truths. This seems wrong.
But we need to be clear about the data (as Stalnaker has emphasized,
for example in 1991 and 1999). It's
not a datum that we don't give credence 1 to all necessary truths.
"Credence" is a theoretical term. The data that cast doubt on logical
omniscience are things like this:

I utter "I don't know the 12th digit of pi".
I utter "I'm more confident that the 12t...]]></description>
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