# Logic 2: Modal Logic

Lecture 18

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Target: 
$$\forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow \neg \exists x (Fx \land Gx)$$

1. 
$$\neg(\forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow \neg \exists x(Fx \land Gx))$$
 (Ass.)

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$$\neg (\forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow \neg \exists x (Fx \land Gx))$$
 (Ass.)  
2.  $\forall x \neg Fx$  (1)

3. 
$$\neg \neg \exists x (Fx \land Gx)$$
 (1)

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3.  $\neg \neg \exists x(Fx \land Gx)$  (1)  
4.  $\exists x(Fx \land Gx)$  (3)

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3.  $\neg \neg \exists x(Fx \land Gx)$  (1)  
4.  $\exists x(Fx \land Gx)$  (3)  
5.  $Fa \land Ga$  (4)

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(Ass.)2. $\forall x \neg Fx$ (1)3. $\neg \neg \exists x(Fx \land Gx)$ (1)4. $\exists x(Fx \land Gx)$ (3)5. $Fa \land Ga$ (4)6. $Fa$ (5)7. $Ga$ (5)

Target: 
$$\forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow \neg \exists x (Fx \land Gx)$$

1.	$\neg(\forall x \neg Fx \rightarrow \neg \exists x(Fx \land Gx))$	(Ass.)
2.	$\forall x \neg Fx$	(1)
3.	$\neg \neg \exists x(Fx \land Gx)$	(1)
4.	$\exists x(Fx \land Gx)$	(3)
5.	Fa ∧ Ga	(4)
6.	Fa	(5)
7.	Ga	(5)
8.	¬Fa	(2)
	Х	



Self-Identity: Leibniz' Law:

$$c = c$$

$$A$$

$$A[c//b]$$

1. 
$$\neg \forall x \forall y ((Rxy \land x = y) \rightarrow Rxx)$$
 (Ass.)

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$$\neg \forall y ((Ray \land a = y) \rightarrow Raa)$$
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$$\neg((Rab \land a = b) \rightarrow Raa)$$
 (2)

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$$\neg \forall x \forall y ((Rxy \land x = y) \rightarrow Rxx)$$
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2. 
$$\neg \forall y ((Ray \land a = y) \rightarrow Raa)$$
 (1)

3. 
$$\neg((Rab \land a = b) \rightarrow Raa)$$
 (2)

4. 
$$Rab \wedge a = b$$
 (3)

5. 
$$\neg Raa$$
 (3)

1.	$\neg \forall x \forall y ((Rxy \land x = y) \rightarrow Rxx)$	(Ass.)
2.	$\neg \forall y ((Ray \land a = y) \rightarrow Raa)$	(1)
3.	$\neg((Rab \land a = b) \rightarrow Raa)$	(2)
4.	$Rab \land a = b$	(3)
5.	¬Raa	(3)
6.	Rab	(4)
7.	a = b	(4)

1.	$\neg \forall x \forall y ((Rxy \land x = y) \rightarrow Rxx)$	(Ass.)
2.	$\neg \forall y ((Ray \land a = y) \rightarrow Raa)$	(1)
3.	$\neg((Rab \land a = b) \rightarrow Raa)$	(2)
4.	$Rab \land a = b$	(3)
5.	¬Raa	(3)
6.	Rab	(4)
7.	a = b	(4)
8.	Raa	(6,7,LL)
	Х	

Semantics of predicate logic

The non-logical vocabulary of  $\mathfrak{L}_P$  are the names and the predicates. Intuitively:

- *Fa* is true (in a given scenario) iff the individual picked out by '*a*' has the property expressed by '*F*'.
- *Rab* is true iff the individual picked out by '*a*' stands to the individual picked out by '*b*' in the relation expressed by '*R*'.

To settle the truth-values of  $\mathfrak{L}_P$ -sentences in a scenario, we might specify

- (a) which individuals are picked out by the names,
- (b) which properties and relations are expressed by the predicates, and
- (c) which individuals have which properties and stand in which relations to one another.

We can be more economical.

Instead of (b) and (c), we simply specify which predicates apply to which individuals.

V(a) = Alice V(F) = { Alice, Bob }

V(F) is the set of individuals to which F applies.

Fa is true because V(a) is a member of V(F).

V(a) = Alice V(b) = Bob V(F) = { Alice, Bob } V(R) = { (Alice, Alice), (Bob, Alice) }

Raa is true because  $\langle V(a), V(a) \rangle$  is a member of V(R). Rab is false because  $\langle V(a), V(b) \rangle$  is not a member of V(R). V(a) = Alice V(F) = { Alice, Bob }

Is ∀*xFx* true?

It depends on whether the scenario involves other individuals than Alice and Bob.

So we also need to specify the set of all relevant individuals in the scenario.

#### A (classical) first-order model is a pair $\langle D, V \rangle$ consisting of

- a non-empty set D, and
- a function V that assigns
  - to each name a member of D,
  - to each 1-place predicate a subset of D,
  - to each *n*-place predicate (n > 1) a set of *n*-tuples from *D*.

```
D = {Alice, Bob, Carol}
V(a) = Alice
V(b) = Bob
V(F) = { Alice, Bob }
```

Which of these are true?

- 1.  $Fa \rightarrow Fb$
- 2. ∀xFx
- 3. ∃*xFx*
- 4.  $\forall x \exists y (Fx \lor \neg Fy)$

```
D = {Alice, Bob, Carol}
V(a) = Alice
V(b) = Bob
V(F) = { Alice, Bob }
```

4.  $\forall x \exists y (Fx \lor \neg Fy)$ 

Fx and Fy are neither true nor false.

*Fx* is true if *x* picks out Alice or Bob. *Fy* is true if *y* picks out Alice or Bob.

 $Fx \lor \neg Fy$  is true if x picks out Alice or Bob or y picks out Carol.

 $\exists y A$  is true iff there is some interpretation of y that makes A true.

 $\exists y(Fx \lor \neg Fy)$  is true no matter what x picks out.

 $\mathfrak{L}_{P}$ -sentences are true or false relative to an interpretation of the variables.

Semantics of first-order predicate logic					
(a)	$M, g \models \phi t_1 \dots t_n$	iff $\langle [t_1]^{M,g}, \ldots, [t_n]^{M,g} \rangle \in V(\phi).$			
(b)	$M,g \models s = t$	iff $[s]^{M,g} = [t]^{M,g}$ .			
(c)	$\textit{M,g} \models \neg \textit{A}$	iff $M, g \not\models A$ .			
(d)	$M,g \models A \land B$	iff <i>M</i> , $g \models A$ and <i>M</i> , $g \models B$ .			
(e)	$M,g \models A \lor B$	iff <i>M</i> , $g \models A$ or <i>M</i> , $g \models B$ .			
(f)	$M, g \models A \rightarrow B$	iff <i>M</i> , $g \models B$ or <i>M</i> , $g \not\models A$ .			
(g)	$M, g \models A \leftrightarrow B$	iff $M, g \models (A \rightarrow B)$ and $M, g \models (B \rightarrow A)$ .			
(h)	$M,g\models\forall xA$	iff <i>M</i> , $g' \models A$ for all <i>x</i> -variants $g'$ of <i>g</i> .			
(i)	М, д ⊨ ∃хА	iff <i>M</i> , $g' \models$ A for some <i>x</i> -variant $g'$ of <i>g</i> .			

# Modal Predicate Logic: De dicto and de re

In modal predicate logic, we can "look inside" the sentence letters of  $\mathfrak{L}_M$ .

It is certain that all myriapods are oviparous. It is possible that some arthropods are myriapods.

It is possible that some arthropods are oviparous.

 $\mathfrak{L}_M$ :  $\Box p, \Diamond q :. \Diamond r$ 

 $\mathfrak{L}_{MP}: \quad \Box \forall x (Fx \to Gx), \, \Diamond \exists x (Hx \land Fx) \therefore \Diamond \exists x (Hx \land Gx)$ 

Let F mean '- win the lottery'.

- ∀*x*◊*Fx*

 $\forall \forall x Fx$  is **de dicto**: it assert of a proposition ( $\forall x Fx$ ) that it is possible.

 $\forall x \Diamond Fx$  is **de re**: is attributes a modal property to certain things.

#### Modal Predicate Logic: De dicto and de re

- Everyone in this room might have stolen the jewels.
- $\forall x(Ixr \rightarrow \Diamond Sxj)$
- $\Diamond \forall x (Ixr \rightarrow Sxj)$
- The Russian president might have been trustworthy.
- $\Diamond \exists x (Px \land \forall y (Py \rightarrow y = x) \land Tx)$
- $\exists x(Px \land \forall y(Py \rightarrow y=x) \land \Diamond Tx)$