Logic 2: Modal Logic

Lecture 11

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Normal deontic logics

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Deontic logic formalizes reasoning about norms.

- Obligation
- Permission
- Prohibition
- Optionality
- Rights
- Duties
- Supererogation
- etc.

Normal deontic logics

We focus on two operators:

- O: It is obligatory that ...
- P: It is allowed that ...

You must return the library book

$\Rightarrow$ It is obligatory that you return the library book

$\Rightarrow \mathrm{O}\, p$

Simple absolutist Kripke semantics

Call a world **ideal** if it contains no violations of any (relevant) norms.

O A is true iff A is true at all ideal worlds.
P A is true iff A is true at some ideal world.

Simple absolutist Kripke semantics

$M, w \models \mathrm{O}A$ iff $M, v \models A$ for all v with wRv.
$M, w \models \mathrm{P}A$ iff $M, v \models A$ for some v with wRv.

Interpret wRv as: v is one of the ideal worlds.

- Is R reflexive (every world can see itself)?
- Is R serial (every world can see some world)?
- Is R transitive (if wRv and vRu then wRu)?
- Is R symmetric (if wRv then vRw)?
- Is R euclidean (if wRv and wRu then vRu)?

Assuming seriality, we get the logic KD45.

Normal deontic logics

(Deontic) KD45 is axiomatized by the propositional schemas **A1–A3** plus

- (**K**) $\mathsf{O}(A \to B) \to (\mathsf{O}A \to \mathsf{O}B)$
- (**D**) $\mathsf{O}A \to \mathsf{P}A$
- (**4**) $\mathsf{O}A \to \mathsf{O}\mathsf{O}A$
- (**5**) $\mathsf{P}A \to \mathsf{O}\mathsf{P}A$

and the rules **MP** and **Nec**.

Simple relativist Kripke semantics

$M, w \models \mathrm{O}A$ iff $M, v \models A$ for all v with wRv.
$M, w \models \mathrm{P}A$ iff $M, v \models A$ for some v with wRv.

Interpret wRv as: v is ideal relative to the norms of w.

- Is R reflexive (every world can see itself)?
- Is R serial (every world can see some world)?
- Is R transitive (if wRv and vRu then wRu)?
- Is R symmetric (if wRv then vRw)?
- Is R euclidean (if wRv and wRu then vRu)?

Assuming seriality, we get the **standard deontic logic** D.

Challenges to normal deontic logics

Challenges to normal deontic logics

1. Obligatory tautologies

If A is true at all worlds, then $\mathsf{O}A$ is true at all worlds.

$\models_K \mathsf{O}(p \vee \neg p)$

But are you obligated to either go to class or not go to class?

Challenges to normal deontic logics

2. No scenarios without norms (Chellas 1980)

If there are no norms, then there are no obligations or permissions.

It is not a logical truth that there are norms.

$\models_K \mathsf{O}(p \vee \neg p)$
$\models_K \mathsf{P}(p \vee \neg p)$

Challenges to normal deontic logics

3. Conflicting obligations (Lemmon 1962)

You may be obligated to do p and obligated to do $\neg p$, without being obligated to do everything.

$\not\models_K (\mathsf{O}\, p \wedge \mathsf{O}\, \neg p) \rightarrow \mathsf{O}\, q$.

Challenges to normal deontic logics

4. The Samaritan Paradox (Prior 1958)

Smith has been robbed and injured.

- Jones ought to help the injured Smith.
- That Jones helps the injured Smith entails that Smith has been injured.

In Kripke semantics, if O A is true, and A entails B, then O B is true.

- So: Smith ought to have been injured?!

Challenges to normal deontic logics

5. The Knowledge Paradox (Aqvist 1967)

- Jones ought to know that there is a fire.
- That Jones knows that there is a fire entails that there is a fire.
- So there ought to be a fire?

6. The Bank Robber Paradox

Mary robbed a bank.

- Mary ought to go to jail.
- Mary ought to not have robbed the bank.

$\models_K (\mathrm{O}A \wedge \mathrm{O}B) \rightarrow \mathrm{O}(A \wedge B)$

- So: it ought to be the case that Mary didn't rob the bank and yet she goes to jail?

7. Professor Procrastinate (Pargetter and Jackson 1986)

- Professor Procrastinate ought not to accept the review.
- Professor Procrastinate ought to accept and complete the review.

$\models_K \mathrm{O}(A \wedge B) \rightarrow \mathrm{O}A$

Challenges to normal deontic logics

8. Ross's Paradox (Ross 1943)

Intuitively,

- you must either mail or burn the letter

entails

- you are permitted to mail the letter, and
- you are permitted to burn the letter.

But $\not\models_K \mathrm{O}\, m \rightarrow \mathrm{O}(m \vee b)$

9. The Paradox of Free Choice (von Wright 1967)

Intuitively,

- you may have beer or wine

entails

- you are permitted to have beer, and
- you are permitted to have wine.

But $\not\models_K \mathrm{P}\, b \rightarrow \mathrm{P}(b \vee w)$.

10. The Gentle Murder Paradox (Forrester 1984)

- John ought to not buy meat.
- If he does buy meat, he should buy meat from sustainable sources.
- John does buy meat.

- $\mathrm{O}\,\neg p$
- $p \rightarrow \mathrm{O}\,q$
- p

By modus ponens, we can infer $\mathrm{O}\,q$. That seems wrong.

(Also, since q entails p, we get $\mathrm{O}\,p$.)

10. The Gentle Murder Paradox (Forrester 1984)

- John ought to not buy meat.
- If he does buy meat, he should buy meat from sustainable sources.
- John does buy meat.

- $\mathrm{O}\,\neg p$
- $\mathrm{O}(p \rightarrow q)$
- p

Now we can no longer infer $\mathrm{O}\,q$.

But $\models_K \mathrm{O}\,\neg p \rightarrow \mathrm{O}(p \rightarrow r)$.

So

- If John does buy meat, he should buy from factory farms?

11. The Miners Puzzle (Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010)

- If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A.
- If the miners are in shaft B, we ought to block shaft B.
- We ought to block neither shaft.

- $s_A \vee s_B$
- $s_A \rightarrow \mathrm{O}\, b_A$
- $s_B \rightarrow \mathrm{O}\, b_B$
- $\mathrm{O}(\neg b_A \wedge \neg b_B)$

These are inconsistent in K.

11. The Miners Puzzle (Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010)

- If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A.
- If the miners are in shaft B, we ought to block shaft B.
- We ought to block neither shaft.

- $s_A \vee s_B$
- $\mathrm{O}(s_A \rightarrow b_A)$
- $\mathrm{O}(s_B \rightarrow b_B)$
- $\mathrm{O}(\neg b_A \wedge \neg b_B)$

In any normal modal logic, these entail

- $\mathrm{O}(\neg s_A \wedge \neg s_B \wedge \neg b_A \wedge \neg b_B)$