I am a philosopher at the University of Edinburgh. I work on scattered topics mostly in decision theory, philosophy of language, formal epistemology, metaphysics, and logic.

My CV (PDF).

Email: wo@umsu.de
Office: DSB 6.02, 3 Charles St, Edinburgh EH89AD, UK
Office hours: Thursday 3-4pm

Courses 2020–2021

  • Mind, Matter, and Language (Autumn 2020)
  • Logic 2: Modal Logic (Autumn 2020)
  • Epistemology (Autumn 2020)
  • Advanced Epistemology (Spring 2021)

Recent Drafts

  • Knowing the Powers Local PDF
    I argue that anti-Humean accounts in metaphysics have trouble explaining how we can have knowledge of natural modality.
  • The Problem of Metaphysical Omniscience Local PDF
    Possible-worlds models of knowledge and belief don't allow for a priori enquiry. I like these models. But then what is going on when we do metaphysics (or maths)?
  • Evidentialism and Conservatism in Bayesian Epistemology Local PDF
    I show that in a variety of scenarios, including the Sleeping Beauty problem, there is tension between the "evidentialist" norm that one should proportion one's beliefs to the evidence and the "conservative" norm that one should only changes one's beliefs for good reasons. I argue that we should jettison the evidentialist norm.

See all drafts

Latest Publications

  • David Lewis's Metaphysics(with Ned Hall and Brian Rabern)
    An overview of Lewis's metaphysics. I wrote most of the section on counterpart theory, and an appendix on counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic
  • Objects of Choice Local PDF
    Decision theory says that rational agents choose an option with maximal expected utility. But what are the options among which she chooses? The problem is harder than it may initially seem.
  • Discourse, Diversity, and Free Choice Local PDF
    I give a broadly Gricean explanation of various "free choice" phenomena, using ideas from dynamic semantics.
  • Ability and Possiblity Local PDF
    I argue that the classical quantificational semantics of ability modals fails to account for a normatively central kind of ability, and suggest a minor tweak to fix the problem.

See all publications