Hello

I am a philosopher at the University of Edinburgh. I work on scattered topics mostly in decision theory, philosophy of language, formal epistemology, metaphysics, and logic.

Email: wo@umsu.de
Office: DSB 6.02, 3 Charles St, Edinburgh EH89AD, UK
Office hours: Thursday 3-4pm

Courses 2019–2020

Recent Drafts

  • Lewis's Empiricism Local PDF
    Lewis's models of knowledge and belief don't allow for a priori enquiry. I like these models. But then what is going on when we do metaphysics (or maths)?
  • Objects of Choice Local PDF
    I suggest that an agent's decision-theoretic options should be construed as primitive propositions corresponding to possible outputs of her decision mechanism.
  • Evidentialism and Conservatism in Bayesian Epistemology Local PDF
    I show that in a variety of scenarios, including the Sleeping Beauty problem, there is tension between the "evidentialist" norm that one should proportion one's beliefs to the evidence and the "conservative" norm that one should only changes one's beliefs for good reasons. I argue that we should jettison the evidentialist norm.

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Latest Publications

  • Ability and Possiblity Local PDF
    I argue that the classical quantificational semantics of ability modals fails to account for a normatively central kind of ability, and suggest a minor tweak to fix the problem.
    Philosophers' Imprint (2020): forthcoming
  • From Sensor Variables To Phenomenal Facts Local PDF
    I outline a physicalist explanation of why there appear to be irreducible phenomenal facts.
  • Imaginary Foundations Local PDF
    A defense of sense-datum theory, an answer to the input problem for Jeffrey conditioning, and a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
  • Semantic Possibility Local PDF
    I outline an approach to semantics in which it makes sense to construe meanings as sets of possible worlds, and raise some questions about how we should understand the relevant space of worlds.
    In D. Ball and B. Rabern (ed.), The Science of Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018: 360--380

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