I am a philosopher at the University of Edinburgh. I work on scattered topics mostly in decision theory, philosophy of language, formal epistemology, metaphysics, and logic.
Office: DSB 6.02, 3 Charles St, Edinburgh EH89AD, UK
Office hours: Thursday 3-4pm
- Lewis's Empiricism Local PDF
Lewis's models of knowledge and belief don't allow for a priori enquiry. I like these models. But then what is going on when we do metaphysics (or maths)?
- Objects of Choice Local PDF
I suggest that an agent's decision-theoretic options should be construed as primitive propositions corresponding to possible outputs of her decision mechanism.
- Ability and Possibility Local PDF
I argue that the classical quantificational semantics of ability modals fails to account for a normatively central kind of ability, and suggest a minor tweak to fix the problem.
- From Sensor Variables to Phenomenal Facts Local PDF
I outline a physicalist explanation of why there appear to be irreducible phenomenal facts.Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies
- Imaginary Foundations Local PDF
A defense of sense-datum theory, an answer to the input problem for Jeffrey conditioning, and a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
- Semantic Possibility Local PDF
I outline an approach to semantics in which it makes sense to construe meanings as sets of possible worlds, and raise some questions about how we should understand the relevant space of worlds.In D. Ball and B. Rabern (ed.), The Science of Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018: 360--380
- No Interpretation of Probability Local PDF
I argue that none of the usual "interpretations of probability" provides a plausible account of probabilistic theories in science, and suggest an alternative.