Hello
I am a philosopher at the University of Edinburgh. I work on scattered topics mostly in decision theory, philosophy of language, formal epistemology, metaphysics, and logic.
My CV (PDF).
Courses 2019–2020
- Mind, Matter, and Language (Autumn 2019)
- Logic 2: Modal Logic (Autumn 2019)
- Belief, Desire, and Rational Choice (Spring 2020)
Recent Drafts
- Lewis's Empiricism Local PDF
Lewis's models of knowledge and belief don't allow for a priori enquiry. I like these models. But then what is going on when we do metaphysics (or maths)?
- Evidentialism and Conservatism in Bayesian
Epistemology Local PDF
I show that in a variety of scenarios, including the Sleeping Beauty problem, there is tension between the "evidentialist" norm that one should proportion one's beliefs to the evidence and the "conservative" norm that one should only changes one's beliefs for good reasons. I argue that we should jettison the evidentialist norm.
- Belief, Desire, and Rational Choice Local PDF
A philosophical introduction to decision theory, with digressions into Bayesian epistemology and value theory.
Latest Publications
- Objects of Choice Local PDF
Decision theory says that rational agents choose an option with maximal expected utility. But what are the options among which she chooses? The problem is harder than it may initially seem.Mind (2020): Forthcoming
- Ability and Possiblity Local PDF
I argue that the classical quantificational semantics of ability modals fails to account for a normatively central kind of ability, and suggest a minor tweak to fix the problem.Philosophers' Imprint 20 (2020): 1--21
- Discourse, Diversity, and Free Choice Local PDF
I give a broadly Gricean explanation of various "free choice" phenomena, using ideas from dynamic semantics.Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2020): forthcoming
- From Sensor Variables To Phenomenal Facts Local PDF
I outline a physicalist explanation of why there appear to be irreducible phenomenal facts.