Published

  • From Sensor Variables To Phenomenal Facts Local PDF
    I outline a physicalist explanation of why there appear to be irreducible phenomenal facts.
  • Imaginary Foundations Local PDF
    A defense of sense-datum theory, an answer to the input problem for Jeffrey conditioning, and a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
  • Semantic Possibility Local PDF
    I outline an approach to semantics in which it makes sense to construe meanings as sets of possible worlds, and raise some questions about how we should understand the relevant space of worlds.
    In D. Ball and B. Rabern (ed.), The Science of Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018: 360--380
  • No Interpretation of Probability Local PDF
    I argue that none of the usual "interpretations of probability" provides a plausible account of probabilistic theories in science, and suggest an alternative.
  • Subjunctive Conditional Probability Local PDF
    I discuss recent triviality results for counterfactuals, and different proposals for how to understand subjunctive conditional probability.
  • Diachronic Norms for Self-locating Beliefs Local PDF
    I critically survey most norms that have been proposed for updating self-locating credences, and explain why such norms are needed.
  • Granularity Problems(with Jens Christian Bjerring) Local PDF
    We argue (i) that impossible worlds are less useful to model fine-grained linguistic or mental content than often assumed, and (ii) that it is hard to find a notion of content that is neither too coarse-grained nor too fine-grained.
  • Belief update across fission Local PDF
    I complete the update rule proposed in "Changing minds in a changing worlds" by extending it to cases of fission, and add some new arguments and clarifications.
  • Lost memories and useless coins: Revisiting the absentminded driver Local PDF
    I analyse the paradox of the absentminded driver from different perspectives, and make a few general remarks about unstable decision problems, mixed strategies and the link between objective chance and rational credence.
  • Best System Approaches to Chance Local PDF
    An advertisement for Best System Accounts of chance, disguised as a survey article.
    In Alan H'ajek and Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015: 423--439
  • Review of Tychomancy Local PDF
    An essay review of Michael Strevens's Tychomancy: Inferring probability from causal structure.
  • Analytic Functionalism Local PDF
    A critical overview of Lewis's philosophy of mind, with some general remarks on methodological issues.
    In B. Loewer and J. Schaffer (ed.), A Companion to David Lewis, John Wiley & Sons 2015: 504--518
  • Proving the Principal Principle Local PDF
    I explain how various Humean accounts of chance, together with independently plausible constraints on rational belief, entail the Principal Principle.
    In A. Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014: 81-99
  • Against Magnetism Local PDF
    I argue that there is no good evidence that Lewis ever endorsed a magnetic conception of meaning, and that his actual account of language reveals convincing arguments against it.
  • Counterpart Theory and the Paradox of Occasional Identity Local PDF
    I present an extended counterpart-theoretic semantics for modal and temporal languages to account for paradoxes of occasional identity. Unlike in standard counterpart theory, Humphrey's counterpart at other worlds or times turns out to be none other than Humphrey himself.
  • Contingent Identity Local PDF
    A review of arguments for and against the coherence of contingent identity.
  • Variations on a Montagovian theme Local PDF
    In some contexts, one might want to model the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity as sentences. However, this idea faces serious obstacles from mathematical logic.
  • Changing Minds in a Changing World Local PDF
    I propose a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject's location.
  • How Things are Elsewhere: Adventures in Counterpart Semantics Local PDF
    I defend a simple model theory for quantified modal and hybrid logics based on ideas from counterpart theory.
    In G.~Russell and G.~Restall (ed.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2012: 8-29
  • David Lewis: Metaphysik und Analyse
    A book on Lewis's metaphysics, in German. For the most part rather shallow and unbalanced.
    Paderborn: mentis 2009
  • Eigenschaften/Relationen
    In Christian Nimtz (ed.), 100 Grundbegriffe der Philosophie, Reclam 2009: 68-70
  • Notwendigkeit/M√∂glichkeit
    In Christian Nimtz (ed.), 100 Grundbegriffe der Philosophie, Reclam 2009: 190-192
  • Modal Metaphysics and Conceptual Metaphysics Local PDF
    I compare the old-fashioned view of metaphysics as an inquiry into broadly conceptual connections with the by now equally old-fashioned view of metaphysics as an inquiry into modal connections. I argue against proposals by Jackson and Lewis that the two projects ultimately coincide, and claim that we should prefer the conceptual project.
    In Helen Bohse and Sven Walter (ed.), Philosophie: Grundlagen und Anwendungen. Ausgew"ahlte Beitr"age aus den Sektionen der GAP 6, Paderborn: Mentis 2007: 520-528

Drafts

  • Lewis's Empiricism Local PDF
    Lewis's models of knowledge and belief don't allow for a priori enquiry. I like these models. But then what is going on when we do metaphysics (or maths)?
  • Objects of Choice Local PDF
    I suggest that an agent's decision-theoretic options should be construed as primitive propositions corresponding to possible outputs of her decision mechanism.
  • Ability and Possibility Local PDF
    I argue that the classical quantificational semantics of ability modals fails to account for a normatively central kind of ability, and suggest a minor tweak to fix the problem.
  • Evidentialism and Conservatism in Bayesian Epistemology Local PDF
    I show that in a variety of scenarios, including the Sleeping Beauty problem, there is tension between the "evidentialist" norm that one should proportion one's beliefs to the evidence and the "conservative" norm that one should only changes one's beliefs for good reasons. I argue that we should jettison the evidentialist norm.
  • Discourse, Diversity, and Free Choice Local PDF
    I give a broadly Gricean explanation of various "free choice" phenomena, using ideas from dynamic semantics.
  • Belief, Desire, and Rational Choice Local PDF
    A philosophical introduction to decision theory, with digressions into Bayesian epistemology and value theory.
  • Modal Epistemology without Modal Facts Local PDF
    I explore a projectivist account of modality and argue that it better explains our practice of acquiring modal beliefs than realist accounts.
  • Haecceities, Quiddities, and Structure Local PDF
    I seem to suggest that all truths, or at least all truths we can entertain, are made true by the abstract structure of the world.
  • Generalising Kripke Semantics for Quantified Modal Logics Local PDF
    I define Kripke-style counterpart models for a wide range of quantified modal logics, and prove completeness and correspondence theorems.
  • Emperors, dragons, and other mathematicalia Local PDF
    One of the most intriguing applications of possibilia is the reduction of mathematical truths. I argue that this is not only technically feasible, but also supported by general methodological considerations, that it reflects a natural understanding of mathematical statements and that it solves most of the philosophical puzzles surrounding mathematics.