- David Lewis's Metaphysics(with Ned Hall and Brian Rabern)
I wrote most of the section on counterpart theory, and an appendix on counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic
- Objects of Choice Local PDF
Decision theory says that rational agents choose an option
with maximal expected utility. But what are the options among
which she chooses? The problem is harder than it may initially
- Discourse, Diversity, and Free Choice Local PDF
I give a broadly Gricean explanation of various
"free choice" phenomena, using ideas from dynamic
- Ability and Possiblity Local PDF
I argue that the classical quantificational semantics of
ability modals fails to account for a normatively central kind
of ability, and suggest a minor tweak to fix the problem.
- From Sensor Variables To Phenomenal Facts Local PDF
I outline a physicalist explanation of why there appear to be
irreducible phenomenal facts.
- Imaginary Foundations Local PDF
A defense of sense-datum theory, an answer to the input problem for Jeffrey conditioning, and a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
- Semantic Possibility Local PDF
I outline an approach to semantics in which it makes sense to construe meanings as sets of possible worlds, and raise some questions about how we should understand the relevant space of worlds.
In D. Ball and B. Rabern (ed.), The Science of Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018: 360--380
- No Interpretation of Probability Local PDF
I argue that none of the usual "interpretations of probability" provides a plausible account of probabilistic theories in science, and suggest an alternative.
- Subjunctive Conditional Probability Local PDF
I discuss recent triviality results for counterfactuals, and different proposals for how to understand subjunctive conditional probability.
- Diachronic Norms for Self-locating Beliefs Local PDF
I critically survey most norms that have been proposed for updating self-locating credences, and explain why such norms are needed.
- Granularity Problems(with Jens Christian Bjerring) Local PDF
We argue (i) that impossible worlds are less useful to model fine-grained linguistic or mental content than often assumed, and (ii) that it is hard to find a notion of content that is neither too coarse-grained nor too fine-grained.
- Belief update across fission Local PDF
I complete the update rule proposed in "Changing minds in a changing worlds" by extending it to cases of fission, and add some new arguments and clarifications.
- Lost memories and useless coins: Revisiting the
absentminded driver Local PDF
I analyse the paradox of the absentminded driver from different perspectives, and make a few general remarks about unstable decision problems, mixed strategies and the link between objective chance and rational credence.
- Best System Approaches to Chance Local PDF
An advertisement for Best System Accounts of chance, disguised as a survey article.
In Alan H'ajek and Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015: 423--439
- Review of Tychomancy Local PDF
An essay review of Michael Strevens's Tychomancy: Inferring probability from causal structure.
- Analytic Functionalism Local PDF
A critical overview of Lewis's philosophy of mind, with some general remarks on methodological issues.
In B. Loewer and J. Schaffer (ed.), A Companion to David Lewis, John Wiley & Sons 2015: 504--518
- Proving the Principal Principle Local PDF
I explain how various Humean accounts of chance, together with independently plausible constraints on rational belief, entail the Principal Principle.
In A. Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014: 81-99
- Against Magnetism Local PDF
I argue that there is no good evidence that Lewis ever endorsed a magnetic conception of meaning, and that his actual account of language reveals convincing arguments against it.
- Counterpart Theory and the Paradox of Occasional
Identity Local PDF
I present an extended counterpart-theoretic semantics for modal and temporal languages to account for paradoxes of occasional identity. Unlike in standard counterpart theory, Humphrey's counterpart at other worlds or times turns out to be none other than Humphrey himself.
- Contingent Identity Local PDF
A review of arguments for and against the coherence of contingent identity.
- Variations on a Montagovian theme Local PDF
In some contexts, one might want to model the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity as sentences. However, this idea faces serious obstacles from mathematical logic.
- Changing Minds in a Changing World Local PDF
I propose a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject's location.
- How Things are Elsewhere: Adventures in Counterpart
Semantics Local PDF
I defend a simple model theory for quantified modal and hybrid logics based on ideas from counterpart theory.
In G.~Russell and G.~Restall (ed.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2012: 8-29
- David Lewis: Metaphysik und Analyse
A book on Lewis's metaphysics, in German. For the most part rather
shallow and unbalanced.
Paderborn: mentis 2009
In Christian Nimtz (ed.), 100 Grundbegriffe der Philosophie, Reclam 2009: 68-70
In Christian Nimtz (ed.), 100 Grundbegriffe der Philosophie, Reclam 2009: 190-192
- Modal Metaphysics and Conceptual Metaphysics Local PDF
I compare the old-fashioned view of metaphysics as an inquiry into broadly conceptual connections with the by now equally old-fashioned view of metaphysics as an inquiry into modal connections. I argue against proposals by Jackson and Lewis that the two projects ultimately coincide, and claim that we should prefer the conceptual project.
In Helen Bohse and Sven Walter (ed.), Philosophie: Grundlagen und
Anwendungen. Ausgew"ahlte Beitr"age aus den
Sektionen der GAP 6, Paderborn: Mentis 2007: 520-528