Publications

  • 2022 The Problem of Metaphysical Omniscience Local PDF
    I like possible-worlds models of knowledge and belief. These models don't allow for a priori enquiry. But then what is going on when we do metaphysics (or maths)?
    Helen Beebee and J.R.A. Fisher (ed.), Perspectives on the Philosophy of David K. Lewis, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2022: 23-40
  • 2021 David Lewis's Metaphysics(with Ned Hall and Brian Rabern)
    An overview of Lewis's metaphysics. I wrote most of the section on counterpart theory, and an appendix on counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic
  • 2021 Discourse, Diversity, and Free Choice Local PDF
    I give a broadly Gricean explanation of various "free choice" phenomena, using ideas from dynamic semantics.
  • 2021 Objects of Choice Local PDF
    Decision theory says that rational agents choose an option with maximal expected utility. But what are the options among which she chooses?
  • 2020 Ability and Possiblity Local PDF
    I argue that the classical quantificational semantics of ability modals fails to account for a normatively central kind of ability, and suggest a minor tweak to fix the problem.
  • 2019 From Sensor Variables To Phenomenal Facts Local PDF
    I outline a physicalist explanation of why there appear to be irreducible phenomenal facts.
  • 2018 Imaginary Foundations Local PDF
    A defense of sense-datum theory, an answer to the input problem for Jeffrey conditioning, and a solution to the hard problem of consciousness.
  • 2018 Semantic Possibility Local PDF
    I outline an approach to semantics in which it makes sense to construe meanings as sets of possible worlds, and raise some questions about how we should understand the relevant space of worlds.
    D. Ball and B. Rabern (ed.), The Science of Meaning, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2018: 360--380
  • 2018 No Interpretation of Probability Local PDF
    I argue that none of the usual "interpretations of probability" provides a plausible account of probabilistic theories in science, and suggest an alternative.
  • 2018 Subjunctive Conditional Probability Local PDF
    I discuss recent triviality results for counterfactuals and different proposals for how to understand subjunctive conditional probability.
  • 2017 Diachronic Norms for Self-locating Beliefs Local PDF
    I critically survey most norms that have been proposed for updating self-locating credences, and explain why such norms are needed.
  • 2016 Granularity Problems(with Jens Christian Bjerring) Local PDF
    We argue (i) that impossible worlds are less useful to model fine-grained linguistic or mental content than often assumed, and (ii) that it is hard to find a notion of content that is neither too coarse-grained nor too fine-grained.
  • 2015 Belief update across fission Local PDF
    I complete the update rule proposed in "Changing minds in a changing worlds" by extending it to cases of fission, and add some new arguments and clarifications.
  • 2015 Best System Approaches to Chance Local PDF
    An advertisement for Best System Accounts of chance, disguised as a survey article.
    Alan H'ajek and Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2015: 423--439
  • 2015 Lost memories and useless coins: Revisiting the absentminded driver Local PDF
    I analyse the paradox of the absentminded driver from different perspectives, and make a few general remarks about unstable decision problems, mixed strategies and the link between objective chance and rational credence.
  • 2015 Analytic Functionalism Local PDF
    A critical overview of Lewis's philosophy of mind, with some general remarks on methodological issues.
    B. Loewer and J. Schaffer (ed.), A Companion to David Lewis, John Wiley & Sons 2015: 504--518
  • 2015 Review of Tychomancy Local PDF
    An essay review of Michael Strevens's Tychomancy: Inferring probability from causal structure.
  • 2014 Against Magnetism Local PDF
    I argue that there is no good evidence that Lewis ever endorsed a magnetic conception of meaning, and that his actual account of language reveals convincing arguments against it.
  • 2014 Proving the Principal Principle Local PDF
    I explain how various Humean accounts of chance, together with independently plausible constraints on rational belief, entail the Principal Principle.
    A. Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014: 81-99
  • 2014 Counterpart Theory and the Paradox of Occasional Identity Local PDF
    I present an extended counterpart-theoretic semantics for modal and temporal languages to account for paradoxes of occasional identity. Unlike in standard counterpart theory, Humphrey's counterpart at other worlds or times turns out to be none other than Humphrey himself.
  • 2013 Contingent Identity Local PDF
    A review of arguments for and against the coherence of contingent identity.
  • 2013 Variations on a Montagovian theme Local PDF
    In some contexts, one might want to model the objects of knowledge, belief, probability, apriority or analyticity as sentences. However, this idea faces serious obstacles from mathematical logic.
  • 2012 Changing Minds in a Changing World Local PDF
    I propose a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject's location.
  • 2012 How Things are Elsewhere: Adventures in Counterpart Semantics Local PDF
    I defend a simple model theory for quantified modal and hybrid logics based on ideas from counterpart theory.
    G.~Russell and G.~Restall (ed.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2012: 8-29
  • 2009 David Lewis: Metaphysik und Analyse
    A shallow and unbalanced book on Lewis's metaphysics, in German.
    Paderborn: mentis 2009
  • 2009 Eigenschaften/Relationen
    Christian Nimtz (ed.), 100 Grundbegriffe der Philosophie, Reclam 2009: 68-70
  • 2009 Notwendigkeit/M√∂glichkeit
    Christian Nimtz (ed.), 100 Grundbegriffe der Philosophie, Reclam 2009: 190-192
  • 2007 Modal Metaphysics and Conceptual Metaphysics Local PDF
    I compare the old-fashioned view of metaphysics as an inquiry into broadly conceptual connections with the by now equally old-fashioned view of metaphysics as an inquiry into modal connections. I argue against proposals by Jackson and Lewis that the two projects ultimately coincide, and claim that we should prefer the conceptual project.
    Helen Bohse and Sven Walter (ed.), Philosophie: Grundlagen und Anwendungen. Ausgewahlte Beitrage aus den Sektionen der GAP 6, Paderborn: Mentis 2007: 520-528

Unpublished Works

  • 2024 Unspecific Antecedents Local PDF
    I discuss a range of phenomena surrounding the "Simplification of Disjunctive Antecedents" and argue for a pragmatic explanation.
  • 2023 Taming Counterpart Semantics Local PDF
    I define a counterpart-theoretic semantics for quantified modal logic and show that it can be used to characterize a wide range of systems.
  • 2023 Belief, Desire, and Rational Choice Local PDF
    A philosophical introduction to decision theory, with digressions into Bayesian epistemology and value theory.
  • 2023 Logic 2: Modal Logic Local PDF
    An introduction to modal logic for philosophy students.
  • 2021 Knowing the Powers Local PDF
    I argue that anti-Humean accounts in metaphysics have trouble explaining how we can have knowledge of natural modality.
  • 2018 Evidentialism and Conservatism in Bayesian Epistemology Local PDF
    I show that in a variety of scenarios, including the Sleeping Beauty problem, there is tension between the "evidentialist" norm that one should proportion one's beliefs to the evidence and the "conservative" norm that one should only changes one's beliefs for good reasons. I argue that we should jettison the evidentialist norm.
  • 2015 Haecceities, Quiddities, and Structure Local PDF
    I seem to suggest that all truths, or at least all truths we can entertain, are made true by the abstract structure of the world.
  • 2005 Emperors, dragons, and other mathematicalia Local PDF
    One of the most intriguing applications of possibilia is the reduction of mathematical truths. I argue that this is not only technically feasible, but also supported by general methodological considerations, that it reflects a natural understanding of mathematical statements and that it solves most of the philosophical puzzles surrounding mathematics.