"Norms of assertion"
Two rather different things sometimes seem to go under the name "norms of assertion", and it might be useful to keep them apart. Often, e.g. by Williamson, norms of assertion are characterised as constitutive norms of a particular speech act. Roughly, a constitutive norm for an activity X is a norm you must obey, or try to obey, in order to partake in activity X. The rules of chess are a paradigm example: to play chess, you have to move the pieces in a particular way across the board. The other kind of "norm of assertion" would be a genuine social norm that is normally in force when people make an assertion.
Many social norms are not constitutive of any particular activity: tipping in cafes or helping your neighbours are not things you have to do in order to partake in a particular activity -- except perhaps in the activity being a good citizen, i.e. being someone who follows the social norms. More importantly, norms that are constitutive of this or that activity need not be social norms at all. In many circumstances, there is no social norm to jump from roof-top to roof-top, although this is constitutive of a certain game popular among adolescents in France. Of course, if you are socially committed to partake in activity X, then the constitutive norms of X become social norms. In extension, social and constitutive norms may overlap, but the two concepts are still very different.
How do we check if something is a social norm? We see whether people are criticised for deviations, whether those who deviate tend to accept criticism and apologise or offer excuses, etc. This is exactly the kind of data philosophers often point at when they discuss norms of assertion. It is not clear why such facts should be relevant if the topic are constitutive norms of assertion. Perhaps the argument is that by uttering certain sentences, speakers commit themselves to partake in the activity of assertion, and hence the constitutive norms of assertion can be read off from the social norms then in force.
Both steps in this argument are questionable. By uttering "the door is locked", I certainly commit myself to various things. For instance, I commit myself to the door being locked. Do I also commit myself to partake in a special activity of assertion? Compare the social norms that come in force when I walk into the office with a big cake. I am obliged to offer my co-workers some of the cake; but is this because by entering the office with cake I have committed myself to partake in a special activity of, uhm, appropriately entering an office with cake, with its own constitutive norms? This is at best a rather stretched description of what is going on.
For any activity X, there is also an activity X+ of doing X while obeying the social norms. The social norms in force when doing X are then constitutive norms of X+. But talk of constitutive norms of X+ing just adds a superfluous level of descriptive complexity to what are really social norms of Xing.
The problem with the second step in the above argument is that "assertion" isn't quite a term like X+: one can make assertions that violate social norms. Some people do that all the time. But then it isn't obvious how one could read off the constitutive norms of assertion by looking at the social norms in place when someone makes an assertion.
It is unclear to me whether there are any constitutive norms of assertion, and if so, what use uncovering these norms would be in a theory of linguistic communication. Perhaps the only constitutive norm of assertion is to utter grammatical sentences, although we normally expect more from a speaker? Or perhaps the constitutive norm of assertion is to utter sentences that could not possibly be false, and we normally expect less?
The more interesting and important question is the second one, the one about social norms concerning assertions, or better: about social norms concerning utterances of declarative sentences. When I say "the door is locked", I first and foremost utter a declarative sentence. Whether I also made an assertion depends in part on the social norms that come in force.
(I recently tried to put this point to Williamson, but I think I didn't express myself clear enough: his reply was that there are no social norms for uttering declarative sentences.)
If I say "Master of logic Quine questioned the a priori."
is it the same as saying---
"logic master Quine a priori questioning" or "a priori Quine logic questioning master" or "Master a priori logic Quine master questioning"-- ?
It seems the first sentence expression is conventional and the others are less so or not at all. If you spoke like the
last three examples you would probably be excluded from the
discussion. Norms are like a club that you join in order to
foster communication. But they can also be limiters of thought. The categories and concepts commonly used by a group may foster communication--but often this communication circulates only within the accepted, the normative, ideas and categories-- like a stagnant pool---and can stifle philosophical imagination, especially with perceived disaproval from colleagues.
Tenure seeking academics think twice before publishing
thought outside the general categorical and conceptual norms of the department.
The mind-body split that has bedeviled us for 5 centuries is the basis for lots of papers--and in a publish or perish profession----it is no advantage to abandon the split. John Searle is one who has abandoned it--but he was tenured and famous before he did so.
We do have to remain within general norms covering all expression in prose in order to engage in Philosophizing at all----otherwise it becomes poetry----highly idiosycratic speech often with greater ambiguity of meaning. And Derrida and Deleuze and continental "literary" philosophy is less conventionally prosey and has more of the ambiguity of poetry.
I enjoy reading it but prefer the analytic tradition.
There is plenty of ambiguity in the analytic philosophical tradition but considering that language is really a system of putting specific things into general categories which must necessarily be vague to be useful --what is more fundamental than "that x is a y"?----analytic philosophy is less ambiguous than even most scientific descriptions of things (in contrast to the clarity of scientific mathematics).
In any case, I advocate breaking out of normative categories and accepted concepts and taking chances in thought
as I hold that Philosophy is an art as well as a science--
yes, I think it is a science!----and is as great an art as poetry or painting. It is the only subject that is so---and that is why I love it so.
Be creative! Except you might get fewer papers published.
oh, well.