I've spent some time this summer upgrading my tree prover. The
new version is here. What's new:
- support for some (normal) modal logics
- better detection of invalid formulas
- faster proof search
- nicer user interface and nicer trees
- cleaner source
I hope there aren't too many new bugs. Let me know if find one!
Suppose we want our decision theory to not impose strong constraints on
people's ultimate desires. You may value personal wealth, or you may value being
benevolent and wise. You may value being practically rational: you may value
maximizing expected utility. Or you may value not maximizing expected
I'm generally happy with Causal Decision Theory. I think two-boxing is
clearly the right answer in Newcomb's problem, and I'm not impressed by any of
the alleged counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory that have been put
forward. But there's one thing I worry about. It is what exactly the theory
should say: how it should be spelled out.
A common assumption in economics is that utilities are reducible to choice
dispositions. The story goes something like this. Suppose we know what an agent
would choose if she were asked to pick one from a range of goods. If the agent
is disposed to choose X, and Y was an available alternative, we say that the
agent prefers X over Y. One can show that if the agent's choice
dispositions satisfy certain formal constraints, then they are "representable"
by a utility function in the sense that whenever the agent prefers X over Y,
the function assigns greater value to X than to Y. This utility function is
assumed to be the agent's true utility function, telling us how much the agent
values the relevant goods.
In my 2014 paper "Against Magnetism", I
argued that the meta-semantics Lewis defended in "Putnam's Paradox" and pp.45-49
of "New Work" is (a) unattractive, (b) does not fit what Lewis wrote about
meta-semantics elsewhere, and (c) was never Lewis's considered view.
There should be a website (or app) that helps with the following kinds of issues.
- I recently wrote a paper on ability modals in which I sketch some ideas for
how a certain linguistic phenomenon might be compositionally derived. I'm really
unsure about that part of the paper, because I'm not an expert in the relevant
areas of formal semantics. I'd like to get advice from an expert, but none of my
friends are, and I don't want to bother people I don't know.
- I once wrote a paper on decision-theoretic methods in non-consequentialist
ethics. But I don't know much about ethics. I'd need someone to tell me how non-consequentialists typically think about decisions under uncertainty, who has already tried to sell decision-theoretic methods for that purpose,
and what key papers I need to read.
- When I submit papers to journals, I often get rejections pointing out
problems that are easy to fix. It would have been good if someone had pointed
out these problems to me before I submitted the paper.
- I think many of my drafts and papers are a little hard to understand, but
I'm not sure why. I'd like someone to give me feedback on which passages are
confusing, where a reader might get lost, etc.
Basically, I'd like to hire (different kinds of) referees to look over my drafts
and give me constructive feedback.
Last week, I gave a talk in Manchester at a
(very nice) workshop on "David Lewis and His Place in the History of Analytic
Philosophy". My talk was on "Lewis's empiricism". I've now written it up as a
paper, since it got too long for a blog post.
I wrote this short
piece for a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies on
Chalmers's "The Meta-Problem
of Consciousness" (2018). Much of my paper rehashes ideas from section 5 of
Foundations" paper, but here I try to present these ideas more simply and
directly, without the Bayesian background.
2018 paper, J. Dmitri Gallow shows that it is difficult to combine
multiple deference principles. The argument is a little complicated,
but the basic idea is surprisingly simple.
Consider a world where eating doughnuts is illegal and where everyone
thinks it is OK to torture animals for fun. Suppose Norman at w is
eating doughnuts while torturing his pet kittens. Is he violating the
laws? Is he doing something immoral?