Subjunctive Conditional Probability
Forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophical Logic.
I discuss recent triviality results for counterfactuals, and
different proposals for how to understand subjunctive conditional
Granularity Problems (with Jens Christian Bjerring)
We argue (i) that impossible worlds are less useful to model
fine-grained linguistic or mental content than often assumed, and
(ii) that it is hard to find a notion of content that is neither too
coarse-grained nor too fine-grained.
Best System Approaches to Chance
In The Oxford Handbook of Probability and
Philosophy, edited by Al Hajek and Chris Hitchcock, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016: 423-439
An advertisement for Best System Accounts of chance, disguised as a
Lost Memories and Useless Coins: Revisiting
the Absentminded Driver
I analyse the paradox of the absentminded driver from different
perspectives, and make a few general remarks about unstable decision
problems, mixed strategies and the link between objective chance and
Belief Update across Fission
I complete the update rule proposed
in "Changing minds in a changing
worlds" by extending it to cases of fission, and add some new
arguments and clarifications.
In Barry Loewer and Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015: 504-518
A critical overview of Lewis's philosophy of mind, with some general
remarks on methodological issues.
Review of Tychomancy
In Philosophy of Science
82 (2015): 313--320. (On JSTOR
An essay review of Michael Strevens's Tychomancy: Inferring probability from causal structure.
Counterpart Theory and the Paradox of Occasional Identity
123 (2014): 1057-1094. (Online
I present an extended counterpart-theoretic semantics for modal and
temporal languages to account for paradoxes of occasional
identity. Unlike in standard counterpart theory, Humphrey's
counterpart at other worlds or times turns out to be none other than
Proving the Principal Principle
In Alastair Wilson (ed.), Chance and Temporal Asymmetry, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014: 81-99.
I explain how various Humean accounts of chance, together with
independently plausible constraints on rational belief, entail the
I argue that there is no good evidence that Lewis ever endorsed a magnetic
conception of meaning, and that his actual account of language reveals
convincing arguments against it.
A review of arguments for and against the coherence of contingent
Variations on a Montagovian Theme
In some contexts, one might want to model the objects of knowledge,
belief, probability, apriority or analyticity as sentences. However,
this idea faces serious obstacles from mathematical logic.
How Things are Elsewhere: Adventures in Counterpart Semantics
In Greg Restall and Gillian Russell (eds.), New Waves in Philosophical Logic, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillian 2012: 8-29.
- I defend a simple model theory for quantified modal and hybrid
logics based on ideas from counterpart theory.
Changing Minds in a Changing World
I propose a general rule for updating beliefs that takes into account
both the impact of new evidence and changes in the subject's location.
Modal Metaphysics and Conceptual Metaphysics
In H. Bohse et al. (Eds.), Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6, Sixth International Congress of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy, Paderborn: mentis 2007: 520-528
I compare the old-fashioned view of metaphysics as an inquiry
into broadly conceptual connections with the by now equally old-fashioned view
of metaphysics as an inquiry into modal connections. I argue against
proposals by Jackson and Lewis that the two projects ultimately coincide, and
claim that we should prefer the conceptual project.