Let F be a fundamental property, understood as a maximal class of possible things that are perfectly similar in one respect. (This is one of Lewis's four proposed definitions of fundamental properties, and I think the best one.) And suppose I have F. What would it take to *know* that I have F?

Given that F is some class { Wo, Fred, ... }, and given that having F means being a member of F, it might seem puzzling how I can be ignorant about whether or not I'm F: how could I fail to know that I am a member of { I, Fred, ... }? But here we are substituting corefering expressions in a (hyper)intensional context, which is illegitimate. If I *knew* that F = { I, Fred, ... }, then I probably ought to know that I am F. So if I don't know that I am F, that's because I don't know that F = { I, Fred, ... }.

Some properties are inherited from wholes to their parts: if x is (completely) made of steel, then its parts are also (completely) made of steel; if x is in the top drawer, then its parts are also in the top drawer. Other properties are upwards inherited from parts to wholes: if a part of x contains steel, then x contains steel; if a part of x touches the ground, then x touches the ground. Yet other properties are not inherited either way: if x is a hand, then x usually has non-hands as parts and is part of non-hands.

Following up on Weng-Hong (1, 2, 3), here are a few thoughts on thresholds for belief.

If beliefs come in different degrees or strength, what do we mean when we say not that Fred believes that P with strength x, but simply that Fred believes that P? Perhaps we mean that Fred believes that P *with sufficient strength*, where context may help determining what counts as sufficient. However, on this account, the following principles should be obviously invalid (both descriptively and normatively):