Wolfgang Schwarz

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Kripke's (Alleged) Argument for the Necessity of Identity Statements

Posted on Wednesday, 09 Aug 2006.   13 Comments logic modal logic identity kripke

I have often encountered in articles, talks and classes the following argument for the necessity of true identity statements, always attributed to Kripke:

1) a = b (assumption)
2) $m[1] a = a
3) $m[1] a = b (from 1, 2 by Leibniz' Law)

The argument is no good, and I think it is very doubtful that Kripke ever endorsed it.

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